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INFO RUEHDX/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0650  
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0152  
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 0389  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2002  
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [KN](#) [RS](#)  
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST

REF: STATE 166404

Classified By: Amb. William J. Burns. For Reasons 1.4(b/d).

¶1. (C) Summary: DFM Alekseyev told the Ambassador October 4 that Russia recognized the seriousness of the situation following the DPRK's announcement and understood U.S. concerns. Alekseyev urged that the Security Council move deliberately to craft a response, but was lukewarm about a potential Five Plus Five meeting. In an October 3 statement, the MFA called on Pyongyang to exercise restraint and make the "right choice." Colleagues from other Embassies are also set to approach the MFA to urge a unified response. End Summary.

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MFA Press Statement  
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¶2. (SBU) The MFA responded immediately on October 3 to the DPRK MFA announcement of North Korea's intention to conduct a nuclear test by expressing "deep concern" and calling on Pyongyang to show restraint. While noting the DPRK's concerns for its security, the MFA urged that a resolution to the problem must be sought through the Six Party Talks and called on North Korea to make "the right choice."

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DFM Alekseyev  
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¶3. (C) The Ambassador raised reftel points with Alekseyev October 4 and urged Russia to cooperate with the U.S. and other concerned partners in the UN Security Council and in the Five Plus Five process. Alekseyev said U.S. concerns were understandable and that the DPRK announcement had created a serious problem. He said the announcement had been unexpected and that Moscow had already begun consultations with Beijing given the latter's relatively good understanding of DPRK intentions and leverage with Pyongyang. Alekseyev noted that he planned to accompany PM Fradkov on his October 16 visit to Seoul and might go on to Beijing. He had no intention of going to Pyongyang.

¶4. (C) Turning to the issue of possible UN Security Council action, Alekseyev acknowledged that the DPRK's expressed intention posed a very serious challenge to the Council's authority. He stated that the Council should move deliberately on next steps, keeping in mind that the regime's reactions were often abnormal ("close to craziness") and that the Council should not take steps that might lead to counterproductive results. Caution was particularly called for in advance of any testing -- the Council would not profit from taking action that prompted the DPRK to do the very thing we all opposed.

¶5. (C) The Ambassador underlined the usefulness of the Five Plus Five in working out a regional solution to North Korea's threatening behavior. Alekseyev was lukewarm about the process, but suggested that the U.S. provide specific proposals in New York or Washington about activating the process. Alekseyev said that Russia wanted to approach this serious situation "carefully," and would likely keep a close eye on Beijing's reaction in formulating Russian policy.

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Third Party Diplomacy  
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¶6. (C) Our Japanese, French and Australian colleagues all have been instructed to go in to the MFA on the tests, but have faced some problems in getting access. The South Korean Political Counselor told us October 4 that he was still awaiting instructions.  
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